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Law and the Theory of Finance:
Some Intersections
Richard A. Posner*
Manuel Cohen, in whose memory this lecture series was estab-
lished, was a distinguished securities lawyer, both as an official
(and ultimately chairman) of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and later as a partner in the distinguished Washington law
firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. So it is altogether fitting that
I should talk about some of the intersections between law and the
theory of finance' -the body of economic theory that is revolu-
tionizing scholarship on the law of corporations, investment,
securities, and much else besides.
I will not try to define "finance," any more than I would try to
define "law." But I cannot resist repeating the surprisingly perti-
nent definition in Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary:
"FINANCE, n.-The art or science of managing revenues and re-
sources for the best advantage of the manager. The pronunciation
of this word with the i long and accent on the first syllable is one
of America's most precious discoveries and possessions."'2
Copyright © 1986 by Richard A. Posner.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lec-
turer, University of Chicago Law School. This is the text of the Manuel F. Cohen
Memorial Lecture given at the George Washington University National Law Center
on November 14, 1985. The research assistance of Stacy Dulberg and the comments of
Gregory Barton, Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and Randal Picker on an earlier
draft are gratefully acknowledged.
1. For a brief and very simple sketch of the basic theory, see R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.1 (3d ed. 1986). The readings listed at the end of Chap-
ter 15 provide some ways into the scholarly literature for those wanting a deeper
immersion. See id. at 426-27.
2. A. BIERCE, The Devil's Dictionary, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF AMBROSE
January & March 1986 Vol. 54 Nos. 2 & 3
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Until recently the theory of finance focused rather narrowly on
the behavior of investors in securities markets. An important
finding in the early literature was that such markets were effi-
cient in the sense that prices in them impounded all or at least
most information knowable about the companies whose securities
were being traded, and about the economy as a whole. Thus it was
hard, and perhaps for institutional investors impossible, consis-
tently to beat the market, whether by picking undervalued securi-
ties to buy or overvalued ones to sell or by spotting impending
markets turns. Hence the rational strategy was passive, a "buy
and hold" strategy that minimizes transaction and administrative
costs and maximizes diversification. The growth of the index or
market fund attests to the growing acceptance of the efficient-
markets concept in the practical world, and has challenged
accepted notions of trust-investment law.3
But as the theory of finance has broadened, the scope of its po-
tential legal applications has grown dramatically, as I shall illus-
trate with a series of examples that will initially seem more
diverse than they are - examples drawn from tort law as well as
corporation and trust law, examples that will as a by-product illus-
trate some surprising parallels among these fields. The examples
are: calculating lost future earnings in a personal-injury case;
deciding when a board of directors shall be allowed to dismiss a
derivative suit; computing damages in securities fraud cases; and
evaluating the propriety of trustees' engaging in "social investing."
I shall try through these examples to bring out the basic principles
of the theory of finance as well as to illustrate the practical appli-
cation of those principles; but the treatment is not intended to be
exhaustive, and the reader is asked to remember that this paper
was originally delivered as a lecture.
L Risk Adjustment in Discounting Lost Earnings to
Present Value
Some readers may be unaware that professors of finance, and
economic consultants using the tools of finance theory, have found
a cozy niche for themselves as expert witnesses in personal-injury
cases. They estimate the present value of future earnings that
have been lost because of a disabling injury or some other cause.
The estimation is necessary, of course, because legal damages are
awarded in a lump.
Although the choice of discount rate is often critical in present-
value calculations,4 two central insights of the modern theory of
BIERCE 240 (1946). There is, alas, no definition of law in The Devil's Dictionary, but
there is a definition of "lawyer": "One skilled in circumvention of the law." Id. at 289.
3. See Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1; Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1.
4. A "discount rate" is simply an interest rate used to translate a future sum of
money into its equivalent in present value.
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finance, perhaps the two central insights, are neglected in these
cases. The first is the positive relationship between risk and re-
turn. Suppose you were asked whether you would be willing to
stake your entire wealth in exchange for a fifty-percent chance of
doubling it. Probably you would refuse on the ground that if you
lost everything (call it $X) you would incur a disutility greater
than the utility you would gain from having another $X. If this is
indeed how you would feel, then you are risk averse and would
demand compensation for taking such a chance; you might for ex-
ample demand that the payoff be $6X rather than $2X. The oppo-
site of risk aversion is risk preference. A gambler might stake his
entire wealth in exchange for a ten-percent chance of doubling it.
But most people are risk averse with regard to substantial stakes.
The widespread purchase of insurance and the behavior of the
securities markets, where riskier investments command higher
expected returns than less risky ones, 5 are important evidence for
this point.
But (and this is the second insight) not every type of risk is com-
pensated. Diversifiable risk is not. By the pooling of many in-
dependent risks, a large risk can be transformed into a near
certainty. This is what an insurance company does when it sells
fire or life or liability or other insurance, and it is what the holder
of a diversified investment portfolio does. Diversifiable risk is not
compensated by a higher return because it can be eliminated so
easily - that is, by diversification.
These points are typically neglected, however, when it comes to
figuring out the lump sum that will compensate a tort victim for
lost future earnings.6 The tendency is to use a riskless interest
rate in discounting lost future earnings to present value, and this
is incorrect. 7 The present value that will be awarded as damages is
a sum certain that can be invested at the riskless rate to yield a
guaranteed stream of earnings equal to what was lost (I abstract
from the problem of inflation, which is distinct). But the stream
that the present-value estimation is designed to value was not a
guaranteed amount. The expert witness may compute the actu-
arial value of the stream correctly, by estimating mortality and
5. The higher expected returns for riskier investments is a central empirical
finding in the finance literature. See, e.g., J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MAR-
KET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 198-227 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (discussing factors considered in determining discount rates).
7. I am indebted for this point to Professor Edward Lazear of the University of
Chicago's Graduate School of Business. The error is akin to using a riskless rate to
estimate the benefits from a long-term capital investment in deciding whether the
investment is worthwhile. On the proper use of risk-adjustment factors in project
evaluation, see Haddes & Riggs, Pitfalls in Evaluating Risky Profits, HARv. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 128.
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unemployment probabilities for each year in the stream; but if the
plaintiff whose lost earnings are being valued is risk averse, he
will prefer a sum certain to its actuarial equivalent since he could
not have diversified away the risk in his earnings stream.
"Human capital" (here meaning earning capacity) is not diversifi-
able-you cannot hold a diversified portfolio of jobs. Hence the
use of the riskless discount rate to calculate the present value of
the lost future earnings overcompensates.
The practical problem is to figure out a personal risk-adjusted
discount rate. It would be easy enough to determine the risk pre-
mium that the average investor in the stock market demands to
assume an investment risk equal to that of the victim's expected
earnings stream, but the tort victim may not be anything like the
average investor. He may have been in an economically risky oc-
cupation that would horrify the average, risk-averse investor-he
may have been an actor or a professional athlete or a commodities
broker. And he may have been in such an occupation precisely
because he likes risk. In that event, he would not consider a
smaller earnings stream generated by a lump sum invested in risk-
free United States' government securities the equivalent of what
he has lost. His risk premium may even be negative. On the other
hand he may have chosen a risky occupation not because he liked
risk but because his earnings in that occupation (for which his tal-
ents may have specially suited him) compensated him for bearing
unwanted risk.
In short, used for purposes of compensating for lost earnings,
the risk-free interest rate could be too low, just right, or too high.
But it usually will be too low. Most people have more risk in their
earnings stream than they want. Stated otherwise, if most people
are risk averse with regard to large stakes, as is generally believed
(on much evidence, including the prevalence of insurance and the
behavior of investors),8 then most wages contain compensation for
economic risk. When a worker is disabled in circumstances under
which he receives compensation for lost earnings, the economic
risk-a cost of work-is eliminated, and this should be reflected
in deciding what interest rate to use in computing that compensa-
tion. On average, then, the risk-free interest rate will be too low.
How much higher it should be could be estimated from compari-
sons of wages in more and in less (economically) risky occupa-
tions, holding constant other variables besides risk. Empirical
work on this subject is just beginning, but the early indications are
that the risk component is substantial.9
Here two caveats must be entered. First, understand that the
risk under discussion is economic rather than physical risk. A
literature stretching back all the way to Adam Smith documents
8. See, e.g., LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 198-227.
9. See Abowd & Ashenfelter, Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary Layoffs,
and Compensating Wage Differentials, in STUDIES IN LABoR MARKETS 141 (S. Rosen
ed. 1981).
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that workers demand a higher wage (other things being equal) to
assume a risk of death or physical injury.10 This premium, how-
ever, will be automatically built into the wage estimates used to
figure the discounted present value of the plaintiff's lost earnings.
Second (and related), risk in the sense of uncertainty must be dis-
tinguished from risk in the sense of an expected loss. The latter
will again be built into the wage estimate. Suppose, to take a very
simple example, that a truck driver will be laid off ten percent of
the time, and his wage is $20,000. Then his expected earnings are
not $20,000 but $18,000, and that is the figure to use in deciding
what his lost wages are. But this adjustment abstracts from risk
aversion. Most people would prefer a guaranteed $18,000 a year to
having a ninety-percent chance of earning $20,000 and a ten-
percent chance of earning nothing. That is what risk aversion
means. Hence a truck driver whose earnings are $20,000 (if he
earns them) will actually be receiving a lower wage in terms of net
utility than a civil servant guaranteed to earn $18,000, unless the
truck driver is risk neutral or risk preferring. This is the point
that the courts have missed.
II Dismissing Derivative Suits: Should the Board's
Decision be Final?
Corporation law has long been concerned with the problem that
used to be called the problem of separation of ownership and con-
trol, that finance theorists discuss under the name of "agency
costs,"'1 but that Ambrose Bierce described more directly in the
quotation with which I began. In the corporate setting, it is the
problem of the conflict of interest between a corporation's manag-
ers and its shareholders and is acute when share ownership is
widely dispersed, which creates serious free-rider problems.
Although there is a market in managers, a capital market, and of
course the corporation's product markets, the constraints exerted
by these markets may not be strong enough to prevent manage-
ment from pursuing its personal gain at the expense of the share-
holders; in due course I shall consider some evidence that they
indeed are not strong enough. The electoral route-the proxy
fight-is not sufficient either; indeed, it is the electoral setting
that creates a free-rider problem in the first place. No share-
holder with a small holding has much incentive to inform himself
about how he should vote, because his vote will have little (if he is
10. E.g., A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 113,123 (reprint 1976) (E. Canaan ed.
1904) (5th ed. London 1789); see, e.g., W. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTI-
GATION OF ARKET PERFORMANCE 9-10, 241-63 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-10 (1976).
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a small enough shareholder, practically zero) influence on the out-
come of the election. Why should he read proxy literature
carefully?
One possible source of conflict of interest between managers
and shareholders should be mentioned specifically, because it
links up nicely with the discussion in Part I. Human capital, as we
saw there, is hard to diversify; an investment portfolio is not. To
the extent that managers acquire human capital specific to the
firm, which is to say human capital that would be worth less in
another firm, they will'have a nondiversifiable asset, and this will
lead them (if risk averse) to manage the corporation conserva-
tively. The shareholders, however, may be effectively risk neutral
by virtue of holding a diversified portfolio of stock and other se-
curities, and if so they will not want the managers to manage the
firm conservatively; they will want it to take some risks.
In any event, an important doctrine of corporation law is the
fiduciary principle, which imposes on the manager a duty to man-
age the corporation as if he had goals identical to those of the
shareholders and which is enforced by the shareholders' deriva-
tive suit-a suit brought in the name of the corporation by a
shareholder rather than by the corporation itself (which is to say,
rather than by the corporate management) against the allegedly
unfaithful manager. The derivative suit can be used to enforce not
only the duty of loyalty but also the duty of care. If an officer or
other corporate employee has squandered corporate assets in some
feckless venture he can be sued, and if the suit succeeds he will be
ordered to make good the corporation's losses. But there are seri-
ous problems in asking a court to second-guess business decisions,
and the law's response has been the business judgment rule, under
which the courts defer broadly to a corporate management's
purely business judgments.1 2 The courts' deference to corporate
management prevents derivative suits from effectively remedying
the conflict of interest that arises from different risk preferences
of managers and shareholders. Hence the principal importance of
the derivative suit is in connection with disloyalty, which is to say
conflicts of interest, such as a manager's seizing a corporate oppor-
tunity for private gain. The derivative suit is a monument to the
problem of agency costs; it would make no sense to allow a share-
holder to bypass corporate management in bringing a suit against
an officer if we were confident that management always acted in
the shareholder's interests.
The specific question I want to discuss is, if the board of direc-
tors votes to dismiss a derivative suit (and let us assume that any
member of the board who is a defendant in the suit will not be
allowed to vote), should that be the end of the matter-should the
case be dismissed? Or should the court make an independent
judgment on whether the suit has merit-and dismiss only if it
12. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,
263-64 (1917) (Brandeis, J.) (seminal discussion of business judgment rule).
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concludes it does not? I am going to defend the conventional legal
position 13 and argue "no" to the first question and "yes" to the
second and thereby expose myself to the academic equivalent of
being accused of sniffing cocaine-of being said to have suc-
cumbed to the "Nirvana fallacy," the "belief that if a given prac-
tice is costly or imperfect then some alternative must be better."14
First of all, the court will not be asked to make an impossible
judgment-namely, could the defendant manager have managed
the corporation better? The business judgment rule should rule
out that kind of silly inquiry. The court will not even be asked,
not yet anyway, whether the defendant was guilty of a conflict of
interest, though that should not be a completely unmanageable
judicial inquiry. All the court will be asked to do is decide
whether the suit has enough arguable merit to be worth prosecut-
ing. That is the kind of question courts answer all the time-
though perhaps not with great distinction-when called on to ap-
prove settlements in class-action or other settings where judicial
approval of a settlement is required.15
Second, the board of directors cannot be fully trusted to assess
the merits of the suit impartially. The defendant may be one of
the directors, hence a friend or at least a colleague of the others,
or he may have engaged in a practice that the directors would like
to engage in or that they have engaged in before. This problem is
well understood and the usual solution is to confine the decision
on whether to drop the suit to a "special litigation committee"
composed entirely of outside directors. 16 But precisely because
they are outsiders and therefore largely dependent on manage-
13. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983).
14. Easterbrook, Symposium on Law and Economics: Afterword: Knowledge and
Answers, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1117, 1117 (1985); see also Epstein, Symposium: Causa-
tion and Financial Compensationm Two Fallacies in The Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1377, 1377-78 (1985); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movemen 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1272 (1982); Gellhorn, Book Review, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1037 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing
and remanding district court's rejection of a proposed consent decree); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of dismissals of class actions). The test for
dismissing a derivative suit was stated by Judge Winter in Joy v. North as follows:
"Where the court determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the
probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation in continu-
ing the action, it should dismiss the case." 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983). In other words, if the net expected value of litigation is negative,
dismiss. This is very similar to the test for approving a proposed settlement: Is the
net expected value of litigation less than the amount of the settlement? Cf. United
States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that the expense
of litigation and the likely outcome of the suit are factors in a district court's decision
whether to approve a consent decree), modified on other grounds, 625 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
16. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-90 (2d Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983).
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ment for information about the company's affairs, they may lack
good information about the merits of the suit. And unless they
dominate the board, they may find themselves expelled from their
lucrative directorships if they refuse to dismiss the suit. Indeed,
maybe directors who get a reputation as hard-liners don't get of-
fered many directorships,17 though on the other hand outside di-
rectors who get a reputation for cravenness will cease to have
much value to the corporation.
All this would be of no importance if the various market limita-
tions on agency costs were highly effective and if the fiduciary
principle-which is, as I said, what the derivative suit enforces-
were therefore unimportant; but it is not clear just how effective
those controls are. 18 Granted, much of the "evidence" of dispari-
ties between managerial and shareholder objectives is superfi-
cial-not only the evidence in the popular literature, which
focuses on what appear to be inflated managerial salaries and per-
quisites without considering whether the requisite managerial tal-
ents may not be as rare as those of champion athletes, movie stars,
and best-selling authors, but also the evidence that consists of the
increasing use by management of defensive tactics against hostile
takeovers, such as "golden parachutes" (generous severance pay
that becomes an obligation of an acquiring firm). Some of these
tactics may benefit the shareholders by converting a tender offer
into a bidding contest that will drive up the ultimate acquisition
price of the firm; others (the "golden parachute" in particular)
may benefit them by reducing managers' opposition to a takeover.
These benefits must be compared with the cost of making a tender
offer less likely by increasing the cost and therefore decreasing
the profitability to the offeror. The costs are direct as well as indi-
rect-not only a higher cost of acquisition but also the loss of
advantage to tender offerors if a tender offer serves merely to gen-
erate additional bids, so that the tender offeror may by his re-
search on finding undervalued firms have conferred an
uncompensated benefit on other takeover artists. The evidence on
whether on balance shareholders gain is mixed. 19
Some of the antitakeover devices-the "poison pill,"20 for ex-
ample-seem a lot less innocent than others (the "golden para-
chute," for example);2 ' but innocent or not, the fact remains that
17. On the weakness of outside directors, see E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POwERn A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 32-48 (1981). For a more
positive view, see Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 293-94 (1980).
18. A complicating factor is that because all corporations are subject to the fiduci-
ary principle, one cannot readily determine the independent effects of the market
constraints.
19. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evi-
dence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-40 (1983).
20. A "poison pill" is in its simplest form a right that shareholders can exercise
upon a triggering event such as the purchase of a large position in the firm's stock.
The exercise of the redemption right increases the cost to the purchaser of obtaining
control of the firm.
21. See M. Ryngaert & G. Jarrell, The Economics of Poison Pills (Dec. 23, 1985)
VOL. 54:159
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tender offers are made at very high premiums over the current
market price of the target firm's stock-thirty percent being a
generally accepted average figure.22 This suggests a large margin
within which managers can divert wealth from the shareholders
to themselves without worrying about inviting a takeover that
may cost them their jobs.23
If the question were, should we invent a new legal remedy, the
derivative suit, to provide an added check on managerial disloy-
alty, I would hesitate to answer "yes" on the basis of our severely
incomplete knowledge about the actual gravity of the conflicts of
interest between managers and shareholders in the large publicly
held firm. But given that we have the derivative suit, the burden
of proof shifts to the abolitionists, and in my opinion has not yet
been met.24 Assigning the burden of proof to the advocates of
change may seem rather a facile means of dealing with ignorance
about the actual balance of costs and benefits, but I think not.
Any serious proposal for legal change requires a substantial ex-
penditure of intellectual resources, jostles other proposals on the
crowded agenda of legal reform, and in short imposes substantial
opportunity costs that are not worth undertaking without confi-
dence that the net benefits of the reform will exceed the costs of
achieving it.
To summarize, if present knowledge does not allow us to con-
clude with any confidence that corporate management, including
the board of directors, is a reliable fiduciary of the shareholders,
there is a place for the derivative suit; and if there is to be a deriva-
tive suit, then it seems to me, for the reasons indicated, that the
board of directors should not be allowed to terminate it without
judicial review. Indeed, it is a contradiction in terms to say that
we shall have the derivative suit, but shall allow the board to dis-
miss it. If all litigation against management is to be controlled by
the board, there is no need for the derivative suit; the corporation,
which is to say the board of directors, can always sue an unfaithful
employee.
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the University of Chicago & the Securities and
Exchange Commission) (manuscript on file at the George Washington Law Review).
22. See, e.g., Walkling & Edminster, Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 27.
23. For some evidence of such diversion, see Walkling & Long, Agency Theory,
Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54, 64, 67 (1984).
24. For a forcefully argued contrary conclusion, buttressed by some (but quite
limited) evidence of the ineffectuality of derivative suits in constraining managers, see
Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986). Fischel
and Bradley would, however, retain the derivative suit for cases of actual fraud, while
jettisoning it for forms of disloyalty that cannot be characterized as fraudulent. See
id, at 299-426 for extensive comments and discussion on the Fischel-Bradley article.
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Bradley and Fischel point out that allowing a very small share-
holder to sue in the corporation's name could impose an external-
ity.25 The shareholder might be interested in pursuing some
objective contrary to the preferences of the other shareholders.
He might be an "ideological" shareholder (to glance ahead at my
last topic) who wanted to harass managers engaged in lucrative
but perhaps unlawful behavior, such as bribing foreign officials.
But the plaintiff does not determine the outcome of the suits he
brings, and there are devices (which probably should be used more
widely) for reducing the problem that Bradley and Fischel have
identified, such as requiring that the plaintiff post a bond to make
good the expenses of the defense if the suit fails.
III Optimal Damages in Securities Fraud Cases
Under conventional principles of fraud, a misrepresentation, to
be actionable, must actually have been relied on by the allegedly
defrauded person; otherwise the fraud is harmless. Suppose
therefore that a misrepresentation in a prospectus for a new issue
of stock leads brokers who read the prospectus to recommend that
their customers buy large amounts of the stock. As a result the
price rises. Suppose that someone who has no knowledge of the
prospectus - in fact has no idea why the stock's price has risen-
buys it at its higher price. Later the fraud is unmasked and the
price falls. Should this buyer be allowed to sue the issuer? The
courts are coming around to the view that he should be. The re-
sult, which the courts call "fraud on the market," is economically
correct. The fraud is effectively impounded in the market price,
and the person who buys without knowledge of the prospectus is
acting on false information to the same extent as those who buy
with knowledge.26 This is a direct application of the efficient-
markets component of the theory of finance.
Now consider what the measure of damages should be in such a
case. 27 At first blush it might seem obvious: it should be the losses
of those who bought at prices inflated by the false prospectus, af-
ter eliminating other possible nonfraudulent causes of the drop in
the stock's price. But what about innocent people who profited
from the fraud? Suppose that a person who is misled by the pro-
spectus buys the stock as its price is rising but unloads it at a profit
before the bubble bursts. Unless he is made to disgorge his profit,
the corporation that issued the misleading prospectus will be
forced to pay damages in excess of the net harm inflicted by the
fraud. Because there is no legal or practical basis for forcing those
shareholders who were unjustly but innocently enriched by the
25. Id. at 271-74.
26. For an excellent discussion, see Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 9-10
(1982).
27. For an analysis independent from but parallel to my own, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, Optimal Damages for Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985).
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fraud to make restitution to the corporation, there is a danger of
overdeterrence.
A stronger statement is possible, is it not? Often the net mea-
surable damages from a stock fraud will be zero. Suppose the
managers of a corporation unjustifiably delay disclosing bad news
about the corporation's prospects in the vain hope that some mira-
cle will restore those prospects. By doing this they stave off for
two weeks a plunge in the price of the corporation's stock. People
who buy the stock during this period will be hurt, but those who
sell it to them will be benefited, because if they had held on to the
stock longer they would have suffered the loss that instead their
buyers suffered. If the managers themselves profited by selling
their stock before the bad news hit the market, there would be no
problem in forcing them to disgorge their gains (i.e., the losses
they avoided). But suppose they didn't. Then what would be the
basis for awarding damages based on the losses of some of the
shareholders?
With this question we encounter the surprising capacity of eco-
nomic concepts to illuminate connections between seemingly un-
related legal doctrines, here securities fraud and the "economic
loss" doctrine of tort law. Consider the famous case of Rickards v.
Sun Oil Co. 28 The plaintiffs, who were merchants, lost business
when a ship owned by the defendant negligently collided with and
put out of commission the only bridge connecting the island on
which the plaintiffs' businesses were located to the mainland. Ap-
plying the doctrine that denies recovery of purely monetary losses
in tort cases involving physical impact (the collision with the
bridge), the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover dam-
ages for their injury.29 The economist explains this result by not-
ing that most and perhaps all of the plaintiffs' loss was balanced
by gain to others, namely the mainland merchants whose busi-
nesses picked up when their competitors on the island were put
out of the reach of consumers. Because there is no mechanism by
which the defendant could have recouped the benefits it conferred
on the mainland merchants, making the defendant liable for the
losses it inflicted on the island merchants would result in a dam-
age award greater than the net harm inflicted and could therefore
result in overdeterrence of negligent conduct.30 Why then should
the victims of securities fraud in my hypothetical example be al-
lowed to recover any damages?
A pragmatic basis is as follows: if the corporation is forced to
pay the losses of those stockholders who were harmed by the de-
28. 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945).
29. IdM at 91-95, 41 A.2d at 268-70.
30. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 169.
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lay in the release of the news, the corporation will have an incen-
tive to police its managers more carefully in the future. This is
true even though the cost to the corporation will be borne by its
shareholders, most or all of whom were innocent. Making them
liable will affect the incentives of the board of directors they
elect.31 There was no parallel problem in Rickards, because the
owner of the bridge had suffered a loss for which he could sue;
indeed, if the gains to mainland merchants perfectly offset the loss
to island merchants, the loss to the owner of the bridge would per-
fectly measure the net loss caused by the accident. But if the only
possible plaintiffs in the securities fraud case are the people who
were left holding the bag when the market for the stock collapsed,
and if their losses are totally offset by the gains to the people who
were benefited by the concealment of the bad news because it ena-
bled those people to sell at a time when the price of the stock was
still high, it seems that damages would be zero, and the fraud
would go unpunished and undeterred.
This would be fine, at least from a narrow efficiency standpoint,
if the only effect of the fraud were distributive, that is, if it just
shuffled wealth among the shareholders without diminishing net
social wealth. But there is a social cost from securities fraud, al-
beit not a cost equal to the losses of the shareholders who were
hurt by the managers' concealment. Three kinds of social cost in
fact are possible, though all are difficult to quantify. First, the
managers may have expended real resources on concealing the
bad news. Second, and related, if fraud is prevalent, investors will
have an incentive to expend more resources on trying to find out
the truth about firms, because they have to overcome the dis-
informational efforts of corporate managers. (This is a major rea-
son, by the way, why theft is not a simple transfer payment, but
inflicts net social costs.) Third, the prevalence of fraud may make
the stock market more volatile, imposing disutility on the risk-
averse investor.
Because there is at present no way to quantify these losses satis-
factorily by the methods of litigation, it seems that the practical
choice is between measuring damages by the losses of those inves-
tors who did lose from the fraud and awarding no damages at all.
The first course seems preferable provided that we have some rea-
sonable confidence that fraud occurred; or stated otherwise, pro-
vided that "fraud" is defined in terms of active, knowing
misrepresentations, rather than in terms of failure to disclose
everything that in hindsight seems material to an investor's deci-
sion. For the more narrowly and precisely the wrongful conduct
is defined, thus reducing the risk of legal error, the safer we can
feel in "throwing the book" at a violator; the less, in other words,
we need fear inducing people to avoid lawful conduct in the neigh-
31. See Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). Of course I am assuming here, in some tension with Part II,
that the problem of managerial agency costs is not insurmountable.
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borhood of unlawful conduct as a means of steering clear of a
heavy punishment risk. A measure of damages that contains a pu-
nitive component-which is one way to describe a damage award
in which the benefits that the defendant's misconduct has con-
ferred on persons other than the victims of the fraud are not net-
ted out-is unobjectionable if the case is suitable for punishment,
which is to say, if it is a case of deliberate wrongdoing, for which
punitive damages are conventionally awarded under tort princi-
ples.32 But if we are to award what in effect are punitive damages
in the name of compensatory damages, we must be sure that the
conduct being punished in this way is indeed deliberate wrongdo-
ing; so we must not define fraud too broadly.
Notice also that if punitive damages are built in as it were to an
award of ostensibly compensatory damages, there is no good rea-
son to award punitive damages in addition, and federal securities
law does not (RICO,33 however, is changing that). Finally, if the
managers derive a measurable pecuniary benefit from the fraud
(maybe they are among the shareholders who sell before the news
hits the market), a restitutionary recovery is unproblematic. The
problem discussed above arises only when the benefited share-
holders are innocent bystanders, like the mainland merchants in
Rickards-and perhaps shareholders should never be considered
totally innocent, because they elected the board of directors that
hired (or included) the malfeasant managers.
IV. Social Investing
My last topic is much in the news these days. It is "social invest-
ing," for example, selling shares of corporations that do business
in the Republic of South Africa and buying securities of corpora-
tions and other institutions in declining regions of this country.34
The issue of whether social investing is a good thing is, in lay cir-
cles, usually cast as a conflict between morality and greed. I don't
know about the morality, but I question how important greed is in
the picture. A portfolio manager who decides to cast out of his
portfolio the shares of corporations that have offices in South Af-
rica, or to include some shares of corporations in the "rust belt,"
will not, contrary to popular belief, necessarily reduce the
32. On the economic rationale of such awards, see Landes & Posner, An Economic
Theory of International Torts, 1 INT'L REV. LAW & EcON. 127 (1981).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See generally Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool of the Defrauded Securities
Plaintiff, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 7 (1982) (discussing punitive and remedial aspects of
RICO).
34. The discussion that follows draws in part on Langbein & Posner, Social In-
vesting and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980).
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expected return of the portfolio, just as trustees need not fear that
if they hold shares in bankrupt corporations the average return of
their portfolio will be below average. The market will bid the
prices of all these concerns up or down until their expected re-
turn, correcting for differences in systematic risk, is the same as
that of alternative investments. Only one condition is necessary:
some investors must be willing to own stock in these firms. At the
margin all stocks yield the same risk-adjusted expected return,
for, if they did not, there would be trading until the returns were
equalized.
This is a central implication of the theory of efficient markets.
When Penn Central stock, before its collapse, was selling at $70 a
share, it was, based on the information then known, as good an
investment as any other stock on the New York Stock Exchange;
had it not been, owners of the stock would have sold it and in-
vested the proceeds in superior-seeming investments, until the ex-
pected returns of all stocks were again equalized at the margin,
taking account of risk. After the collapse, when Penn Central was
trading at $6, it was just as good an investment as before, even
though the company was broke. The company's value was much
smaller, but its price had been bid down to the point where it was
as good an investment as any other stock in its risk class; other-
wise it would have had no takers at $6. Applied to social investing,
this analysis teaches that it makes no difference whether compa-
nies that do business in South Africa have better than average
prospects or worse than average prospects (perhaps because the
future of South Africa is as dim as critics of the South African
government contend); the prices of their stocks will be bid up in
the first case and down in the second until they yield the same
expected returns as the other stocks of their risk class. The ex-
pected return of a portfolio with no South African stocks should
be the same as that of a portfolio with nothing but South African
stocks.
Social investing has costs, in fact three costs-just not the costs
that persons ignorant of the theory of finance focus on. The first
cost is the cost of identifying companies to exclude or include on
social-investing grounds-a slight cost, if only because the
grounds are so nebulous that they do not invite costly research.
The second is the cost of underdiversification of uncompensated
risk. Third, and related, are higher trading costs.
The cost of underdiversification is the main economic worry in
social investing. Whether it is a large or small cost depends on
how many companies are proscribed. If the number is large, the
costs to investors could be very substantial. A recent study finds
that if all 152 of the firms in the Standard and Poor's "500" that
have employees in, or business relations with, South Africa were
cast out of an investment portfolio and replaced by firms without
South African connections, the portfolio would exhibit dramati-
cally higher risk and lower diversification, as well as higher trad-
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ing costs. 35 The reason is that the firms that do business with
South Africa tend to be the larger firms in the market, and when
they are replaced in a portfolio the portfolio becomes heavily
weighted with smaller, riskier firms, which in turn raises the port-
folio manager's trading costs.
This finding casts some oblique light on the issue of morality. It
seems that the companies that do not do business in South Africa
are by and large simply those that are too small to be international
corporations, or that do not produce anything for which there is an
overseas market, or a South African market. It seems, then, that
companies are to be rewarded by social investors for their lack of
commercial success-for not participating in international
trade-and this at a time when many people are worried about
our international trade deficit. Notice also that wholesale divest-
ment may confer capital gains on the buyers (who need not be
Americans) of the divested shares.
Perhaps an even greater danger to adequate diversification
comes from the dying-region type of social investing. If a portfolio
is heavily concentrated in a declining region of the country, the
expected return will not be depressed, as I have said, but the
diversifiable, and therefore uncompensated, risk borne by the
portfolio may be considerable.
Conclusion
This paper has not attempted to educate the reader in the the-
ory of finance; it is much too short for that. It has had the more
modest task of stimulating the lawyer's interest in the subject, by
illustrating the surprising range of fruitful applications that the
theory has to the law and by showing its power not merely to cast
new light on problems both old and new but also to display the
unity of the law, the commonality of fields as disparate as torts
and securities: a unity that I believe is fundamentally economic.
1986]
35. See Wagner, Emkin & Dixon, South African Divestment: The Investment Is-
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